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KNOWING ONE’S LOT IN LIFE VERSUS CLIMBING THE SOCIAL 




To what extent do preferences for redistribution respond to individual beliefs on what 
determines one’s position on the social ladder? To what extent do individuals take 
into account their prospects for social mobility when evaluating the pros and cons of 
income redistribution? As noted by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005, p.897): 
Since redistribution is meant to go from the ‘wealthy’ to the ‘poor’, at any 
point in time one would expect the latter to favour it and the former to oppose 
it. However, the effect of income on preferences for redistribution is more 
complex. To the extent that today’s poor maybe the wealthy of tomorrow and 
vice-versa, the prospects of future positions in the income ladder should affect 
individuals’ current preferences for redistributive policies.  
 
How preferences for redistribution respond to individual beliefs about what 
determines one’s position on the social ladder has been examined by Alesina et al., 
(2001), Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Fong 
(2001) among others. These studies find that people who believe that wealth and 
success are the outcome of connections, family history or luck as opposed to effort are 
more likely to favour redistributive policies. The experimental evidence from dictator 
games, ultimatum games and public good games on altruism, fairness and reciprocity 
similarly suggest that people have an innate desire for fairness and are prepared to 
punish unfair behaviour (Fehr & Schmidt, 2003). The prospect of upward or 
downward mobility influencing preferences for redistribution has been dubbed the 
Hirschman (1973) effect and has been examined in several studies. The effect of self-
assessed likelihood of being upwardly (or downwardly) mobile in the future on the  
desirability of redistributive policies has been previously studied by Ravallion and 
Lokshin (2000) using Russian data, Corneo (2001) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) 
using United States data and Corneo and Gruner (2002) using data for several OECD 
countries. These studies generally conclude that people who have better self-assessed 
prospects of upward mobility are more averse to redistributive policies. 
 
We examine the role of individual beliefs about what determines one’s position on the 
social ladder and the extent to which individuals take into account prospects of 
moving up the social ladder on redistributive preferences in urban China. Urban 
China represents an interesting ‘natural experiment’ to consider the role of these two 
sets of beliefs on leftist leanings and, by extension, preference for redistribution. On 
the one hand China’s market reforms have created tremendous opportunities for 
people to climb the social ladder, particularly through fast wealth creation in the non-
state sector. On the other hand, the marketisation process has generated growing 
income inequities between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ (see eg. Gustafsson & Li, 
2001; Khan & Riskin, 2001; World Bank, 1997). There are whole segments of the 
urban population, such as workers retrenched from the state-owned sector, who once 
held privileged positions in Maoist China, but whom the reforms have left behind. 
These people have little or no realistic prospect of improving their social position and, 
through protest, have expressed longing for a return to the Maoist past. One example 
who received widespread media coverage is Wang Shanbao, a 55-year-old worker 
retrenched from the state-owned sector, whose protest in 2001 took the form of 
drawing sketches of Chairman Mao on the pavement outside his factory, which drew 
daily crowds until the factory managers gave him back his job (Forney, 2003). 
  
The results from a study such as this are important for improving our understanding of 
the political economy of redistributive policy in China.  Through the development of 
the ideal of a ‘harmonious society’, first outlined at the Sixteenth Party Congress in 
2006, Hu Jintao has made reduction in income inequality a centrepiece of the Chinese 
central government’s reform agenda. Leading Party theorist Wu Zhongmin has argued 
that creating a harmonious society entails promoting “social distributions based on 
middle income earners as the dominant social group” (Wu, 2006). In this regard, Wu 
argues that China’s present-day social structure is “neither healthy nor conducive to 
the establishment of a harmonious society” since “more than 80 per cent of the urban 
population is comprised of low or low-to-middle income earners while middle 
incomer earners make up only around 10 to 15 per cent of the population.”  Wu’s 
(2006) understanding of creating a harmonious society is specifically tied to the 
market-oriented goal of achieving an ideal social distribution that is “small at either 
end and big in the middle,” that is, with middle income earners as the vast majority 
and tiny minorities of the very rich and very poor at either end.   
 
Championing the importance of promoting access to education and social protection, 
job creation and reducing income inequality in a ‘harmonious society’ allows Hu to 
sell the evolution of ‘capitalism with Chinese characteristics’ as a socialist market 
regime developed on behalf of the people. While Deng Xiaoping’s hedonistic 
aphorism was ‘to get rich is glorious’, Hu wants to be seen as being committed to the 
disenfranchised and disadvantaged. To the extent that we find a significant positive 
relationship between perceptions that one’s lot in life is determined by ‘connections 
and luck’ and a preference for redistribution, our results would be consistent with the 
rationale of a harmonious society. That is, there is a need to protect those who have 
lost out from the reforms through no fault of their own and, at the same time, ensure  
social stability.  However, to the extent that we find evidence of a Hirschman effect, 
prospects for upward mobility in China’s fast moving market economy could help to 
explain tolerance, or even support, for high levels of urban income inequality. 
 
II. PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTION 
Several factors determine people’s preferences for redistribution (see Alesina & La 
Ferrara, 2005; Alesina & Fuchs-Schundeln, 2007). One consideration is current 
income. The poor benefit more from transfer programs and thus are more inclined to 
support redistributive policies holding all things equal. A second consideration is a 
person’s ideology or political beliefs which may be influenced by a range of extrinsic 
factors including upbringing and environment (Mullins, 1972).  People who lie to the 
left of the ideological spectrum can be expected to be more predisposed to 
redistributive policies.  A third consideration is expected future income. People who 
are poor in period one, but expect to become rich in period two, can be expected to 
oppose redistributive policies on the basis that while such policies benefit them in 
period one, they will disadvantage them in period two. This statement is based on the 
assumption that the same redistributive policies in place in period one will continue to 
be in place in period two. The assumption that once they are in place redistributive 
policies are stable over time seems reasonable (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005). 
 
A fourth consideration is people’s beliefs about what determine one’s lot in life. There 
are two aspects of this consideration. One aspect is what Alesina and Fuchs-
Schundeln, (2007) term ‘altruism’ or Corneo and Gruner (2002) call the ‘public 
values’ effect. The rich may favour redistribution based on a belief that it is 
appropriate for society to support the poor. One might be more likely to hold such a 
belief if one perceives market outcomes as unfair and believe that those who 
succeeded were either well connected, knew the right people or were plain lucky  
(Alesina & Fuchs-Schundeln, 2007). For the rich, such motives may reflect pure 
altruism or be motivated by a desire to avoid the negative effect on individual utility 
of observing poor people on the street (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005). A second aspect 
is what we will call an ‘entitlement effect’.  Poor people who perceive that one’s lot in 
life is due to factors outside one’s control (such as connections, luck, knowing the 
right people or being born into the right family) will feel a greater sense of entitlement 
to redistribution because their lot in life was outside their control. Our purpose in this 
paper is to seek to examine the relative importance of perceptions of one’s lot in life 
and self-assessed prospects to climb the ladder while holding current income, 
ideology and other personal and demographic variables constant for urban China. 
 
III. ECONOMIC REFORMS IN CHINA 
The economic reforms that commenced in the late 1970s have not only led to rapid 
economic growth, but have had a profound effect on the structure of the Chinese 
economy. On the eve of the economic reforms, the state-owned enterprise sector was 
dominant, while the non-state sector lurked on the fringes of the economy. In 1978, 
state-owned enterprises accounted for almost 80 per cent of industrial value added, 
while there were just 140,000 individuals engaged in the private sector (Zhang et al., 
2001). There was no urban labour market and urban labourers were paid according to 
wage grades. These wage arrangements were equalitarian, over-centralized and 
insensitive to variations in performance (Ding et al., 2006). Moreover, the 
appointment and promotion process was based on political considerations, rather than 
performance (Bian, 2002). In the three decades since economic reforms commenced 
the non-state sector has increased in importance relative to the state-owned sector and 
there has been a surge in inward foreign direct investment (FDI). By 2005, the state-
owned share of industrial value added had fallen to less than 20 per cent and the  
domestic private sector alone was estimated to account for about one-quarter of gross 
domestic product (GDP) (NBS, 2005). In 2003, China overtook the United States for 
the first time as the number one global destination for inward FDI, with FDI worth 
US$53.5 billion (Reuters, 2003). In 2004, inward FDI to China hit US$60 billion 
(NBS, 2005) with inward FDI expected to be US$63 billion at end 2006 (NBS, 2007). 
 
The outcome of these reforms have been significant changes in employment policies 
and practices for urban workers, previously characterized by strict bureaucratic 
control, a monopoly on labour allocation through lifetime employment policies and 
severe restrictions on labour mobility (Knight & Yueh, 2004). The demise of 
allocated lifelong jobs, in the push towards a market economy, has resulted in the 
materialization of a competitive urban labour market in urban China (Warner, 1996).  
The compensation structure has been reformed with the objective of linking wages 
with performance. While the precise compensation structure varies across ownership 
forms, the wage differential between position levels has increased and a number of 
market-oriented performance-based components have been introduced such as 
position wages, skill wages, subsidies, bonuses and profit sharing (Ding et al., 2006). 
The emergence of the non-state sector and, in particular, the growth of FDI has 
created a strong demand for skilled workers. Increased competition amongst non-state 
sector employers and the freedom to diverge from a state administered labour system 
has led to the introduction of on-the-job training and performance based promotion 
guidelines as non-state firms vie to attract and retain skilled staff.  
 
Increased opportunities for urban residents to improve their occupational and social 
status are not restricted to the non-state sector. In the pre-reform period and in the 
early stages of market reforms, party membership was an important predictor of  
professional attainment (Bian et al., 2001; Walder, 1995; Zhou, 2001). However, 
promotion patterns have changed over time, even in the state-owned sector. 
According to an official report (Office of Organization Reform), between 1985 and 
1995 in the state-owned sector, college educated managers increased from 22 per cent 
to 32 percent; managers aged below 35 increased from 39 per cent to 43 per cent and 
the number of professionals increased 16 per cent per annum. Using data from 20 
cities collected in 1993 and 1994, Zhao and Zhou (2004) found that although there 
was some evidence of continuing political selection, promotion processes in the state-
owned sector had become increasingly rationalized, reflected in the growing 
importance of education as a criteria for promotion and the active replacement of old 
bureaucrats with a new generation of managers. These findings have been confirmed 
in detailed case studies of specific state-owned enterprises which have found that 
career mobility is primarily based on good performance (eg. Smyth & Zhai, 2003). 
 
While the market reforms have created new opportunities to climb the professional 
and social ladder, they have also led to unprecedented disparities between the ‘haves’ 
and ‘have nots’. As a result of state-owned enterprise restructuring, it is estimated that 
26 million state-owned employees were made redundant between 1998 and 2002 
(Armitage, 2003). Those who have been retrenched from the state-owned sector are 
invariably precisely those who find it the most difficult to find another job. Appleton 
et al. (2002) find that, using survey data from 2000, as many as 11 per cent of urban 
workers had been retrenched and 53 per cent of these remained unemployed at the 
time of the survey. The risk of retrenchment was higher for women, the less educated, 
the low skilled and the middle-aged. The fact that reemployment rates were low 
implying that unemployment will be long-term. The duration of unemployment was 
longer for the unhealthy, the less educated and women with young children.  
 
Alongside the retrenched, China has an estimated 120-140 million off farm migrants.  
These people, who constitute 80 per cent of the workforce in the construction sector 
and 50 per cent of the workforce in the service sector, have made China the world’s 
factory. Simply put, migrants have been the engine room that has driven China’s high 
growth rate and positioned China to overtake the United States as the world’s largest 
economy by 2015 (Allen et al., 2005). However, the returns that migrants have 
received have not been commensurate with the contributions that they have made to 
China’s economic success. Migrants receive low wages, endure long hours and are 
often confronted with poor working conditions. A survey administered by the All-
China Federation of Trade Unions in 2006 found that 65 per cent of migrants were 
working in so-called ‘Three D jobs’ (dirty, dangerous and demeaning).
1 Migrants also 
face social discrimination. Confronted with a city of strangers, often physically 
demanding jobs and few comforts, migrants often experience ‘psychological poverty’ 
(China Daily, 2003) due to isolation, loneliness and social exclusion. 
 
IV. DATA AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
Our data were collected by China Mainland Marketing Research Company 
(CMMRC), a spin-off from China’s State Statistical Bureau, which conducted face-to-
face interviews with approximately 10,000 individuals in 32 Chinese cities in 2002; of 
which, there were up to 8,800 valid responses depending on the specific empirical 
specification employed.
2 CMMRC employs multistage stratified random sampling to 
ensure a representative sample in terms of age, gender and income. Interviewees were 
asked a number of questions about attitudes and beliefs including some designed to 
                                                 
1 Tao Zhiyong, Deputy Division Chief, Department of Social Security, All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions, National Social Insurance Administration Workshop, Beijing, August 2006. 
2 The cities sampled were Beijing, Tianjin, Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Huhehaote, Shenyang, Changchun, 
Harbin, Shanghai, Nanjing, Hangzhou, Hefei, Fuzhou, Nanchang, Jinan, Zhenzhou, Wuhan, Changsha, 
Guangzhou, Nanning, Haikou, Chongqing, Chengdu, Guizhou, Kunming, Lhasa, Xian, Lanzhou, 
Xining, Yinchuan, Wulumuqi, Xiamen.  
capture preferences for redistribution. There were no questions that asked directly 
about preferences for redistribution as used, for example, by Alesina and La Ferrera 
(2005). Therefore we use variables depicting left-wing beliefs. Individuals who 
express left-wing beliefs can be taken as having strong preferences for redistribution 
(Di Tella et al., 2008).  The variables depicting left-wing beliefs centred on access to 
education (Education-L), social protection (Social-Protection-L), income inequality 
(Income Inequality-L) and unemployment (Unemployment-L). Following the approach 
in Di Tella et al. (2008), the L-extension indicates that higher values on these 
variables suggest left-wing beliefs. For example, Education-L is a dummy variable 
equal to 0 if the answer to the question: “Please evaluate the degree of fairness in 
receipt of educational opportunities” was  “very fair”, “fair”, “neither fair nor 
unfair” or “unfair” and 1 if the answer was “very unfair”.  
 
To measure people’s perceived prospects of moving up the social ladder, we use an 
ordered variable capturing responses to the question: “How do you expect your social 
status to change in the future?” Possible responses were 1= “substantial decline”, 2= 
“large decline”, 3= “some decline”, 4= “no change”, 5= “some improvement”, 6= 
“large improvement” and 7= “substantial improvement”.  Most people were 
relatively optimistic about the future. Respondents answered as follows: 0.8 per cent 
said “substantial decline”; 1.0 per cent said “large decline”; 6.8 per cent said “some 
decline”; 19.8 per cent said “no change”; 42.7 per cent said “some improvement”; 
16.5 per cent said “large improvement” and 12.5 per cent considered there would be a 
“substantial improvement” in their social status in the future. 
 
To measure individual beliefs about what determines one’s position on the social 
ladder we used answers to the question: “What do you consider to be the most  
important factor in determining one’s position in life”? We employed a series of 
dummy variables set equal to 1 and zero, otherwise if the respondent considered the 
most important factor to be “diligence and effort”; “good luck and opportunities”; 
“having good social connections”, “knowing powerful people or being born into a 
powerful and wealthy family”. Answers were as follows: 36.1 per cent said “diligence 
and effort”; 30.7 per cent said “good luck and opportunities”; 27.2 per cent said 
“having good social connections”; 14 per cent said “being born into a powerful and 
wealthy family” and 12.3 per cent said “knowing powerful people”.  
 
We also included a series of control variables to measure the respondent’s 
demographic characteristics, income and ideology as well as the location of the city in 
which he or she lived. Alesina and La Ferrera (2005) point out that risk aversion could 
be an important factor explaining preferences for redistribution; that is, those who are 
risk averse have stronger preferences for redistribution. We do not have direct 
measures of risk aversion, such as information on gambling. Thus, similar to the 
approach in Alesina and La Ferrera (2005), we proxy risk aversion using a dummy 
variable for whether the respondent is self-employed. The rationale is that self-
employed individuals may be more prone to take risks.  Full details of the variables 
employed in the analysis including the controls are in the appendix.  
 
The following logit regressions were estimated across the 32 Chinese cities for 2002: 
Beliefs-Lic = αLadder Futureic + βLadder Positionic + Personal Controlsic +φc +εic 
 
Here  Beliefs-L refer to Education-L, Social Protection-L, Income Inequality-L or 
Unemployment-L. Ladder Future measures people’s perceived prospects of moving 
up the social ladder. Ladder Position is a vector of dummy variables measuring 
beliefs about what determines position on the social ladder. The subscripts refer to  
individual i living in city c. Personal controls are a set of variables controlling for age, 
gender, marital status, education, income, occupation and ideology of the respondent. 
φc is a dummy variable denoting whether the individual lives in a coastal province 
where the marketisation process is more advanced and εic is the (i.i.d) error term. 
 
We use five separate dummy variables to examine the effect of individual beliefs as to 
what determines one position in life on the existence of left-wing views. We expect 
that people who consider diligence and effort to determine one’s position in life to be 
less likely to hold left-wing views. We expect people who consider good luck and 
opportunities, having social connections, knowing powerful people or coming from a 
powerful and wealthy family to be the most important factor in determining one’s lot 
in life to be more likely to hold left-wing views and, thus, favour redistribution.  
 
V. RESULTS  
Panel A of Table 1 shows how Beliefs-L vary according to what determines one’s 
position on the social ladder and prospects of moving up the social ladder, controlling 
for personal characteristics (other than ideology) and location of the respondent. 
Consistent with Hirschman’s (1973) tunnelling effect we expect that individuals who 
evaluate their future prospects better to be less likely to hold left-wing views. We find 
that Ladder Future has no statistical effect on Education-L and Income Inequality-L; 
however, individuals who expect their social position to improve are statistically less 
likely to consider the problem of providing social protection and bad management of 
social welfare or the problem of unemployment to be ‘very serious’. Thus, there is 
mixed support for a Hirschman effect with the upwardly mobile having no statistically 
significant view on access to education and income inequality, but statistically less 
likely to hold left-wing views on social protection and unemployment.  
------------------- 
Insert Table 1 
------------------- 
Overall, the results for the effect of individual beliefs as to what determines one 
position in life on left-wing beliefs are fairly consistent with expectations. There is a 
statistically significant positive relationship between each of considering social 
connections, knowing powerful people and coming from a powerful and wealthy 
family to be the most important factor in determining one’s lot in life and three of the 
four proxies for left-wing views. Individuals who considered social connections, 
knowing powerful people or coming from a powerful and wealthy family to be most 
important were all more likely to hold left-wing views on income inequality and 
social protection with the marginal effects of knowing powerful people larger than 
that for the other two variables. Individuals who considered coming from a powerful 
or wealthy family to be most important were also more likely to hold left-wing views 
on access to education, while people who considered social connections or knowing 
powerful people to be the most important determinants of one’s lot in life were more 
likely to hold left-wing views on unemployment. Across left-wing views, considering 
social connections, knowing powerful people and coming from a powerful or wealthy 
family to be the most important determinant of one’s position on the social ladder all 
had their largest marginal effects on left-wing views on income inequality. 
 
In panel A of Table 1, the one ladder position variable that is partly inconsistent with 
expectations is belief that one’s lot in life is due to good luck and opportunities. It is 
statistically significant with a negative sign in the Education-L  regression and 
statistically significant with a positive sign in the Income Inequality-L regression. 
Individuals who believe that the most important factor in determining one’s lot in life 
is good luck and opportunities are statistically more likely to hold left-wing views on  
income inequality, although the marginal effect is smaller than the ladder position 
variables that attribute success to factor’s outside the individual’s control. At the same 
time, individuals who believe good luck and opportunities to be the most important 
factor were statistically less likely to consider access to education to be ‘very unfair’.  
Individuals who consider ‘opportunities’ to be most important may well interpret 
these in terms of opportunities to access education. If so, this result would be 
consistent with the findings for diligence and effort in the Education-L regression. 
Those who consider diligence and effort or good luck and opportunities to be the most 
important factor, do not see moving up the social ladder as entirely outside of their 
hands, as it can be realized through either accessing education and/or hard work.  
 
One possible objection to the findings in Panel A is that we do not control for the 
respondent’s ideology. It may be simply that people who hold left-wing views on the 
issues examined here are of a particular political persuasion and that once we control 
for ideological position the effect of beliefs as to what determines one’s lot in life and 
prospects for improving oneself will disappear. The survey does not have a question 
that asks directly about ideology. Thus, we use the mean value of responses to a 
question on perceptions of conflict between five categories of people designed to 
represent capital and labour, where individuals who report higher levels of conflict are 
assumed to be to the left of the ideological spectrum (see appendix for the details). 
The results including ideology as an additional control variable are reported in Panel 
B. ‘Good luck and opportunities’ is no longer significant in the Income-Inequality-L 
regression, but apart from this the results for the key variables of interest in terms of 
significance, signs and marginal effects are similar to those reported in Panel A.  
  
The results for the variables depicting beliefs that outcomes in life are due to 
connections, who you know or the family into which you were born, rather than 
individual effort, are consistent with the lingering remnants of communist ideology. A 
basic tenant of communist ideology is that one’s economic and social status in 
capitalism is a reflection of privileged upbringing or selective opportunities not 
available to all, rather than individual hard work. Not surprisingly, this view is still 
widely held in urban China today amongst those who have lost out from the reforms. 
Among the control variables, which are not reported, we find that people on low 
incomes and those ‘laid off’ (xiagang), unemployed (shiye), waiting for work (daiye 
renyuan) and receiving government relief (xiangshou zhengfu jiujide pinkun renyuan) 
are more likely to favour redistribution. People on low incomes, those out of work and 
those receiving government relief are direct beneficiaries of redistributive policies. 
We actually find, contrary to expectations, that ‘individual households and the self-
employed (geti hu huo ziwo gu you renyuan (ziyou zhiyezhe))’ are more likely to hold 
left-wing beliefs, suggesting that this group, relative to those not in the labour force 
which were the reference category, are more likely to value the insurance against 
negative income shocks provided by redistributive policies. This could reflect the high 
risk of failure in the non-state sector in China’s uncertain market environment. While 
the returns are potentially high, so are the risks with private entrepreneurs in the 
informal sector facing discrimination on several fronts, including raising bank loans 
(see eg. Tsai, 2002).  We find that older people are more likely to favour 
redistribution. Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007) also found that older East 
Germans were more predisposed to state intervention. The explanation is that socialist 
heritage is important in influencing people’s belief formations and that older Chinese  
(or East Germans) have lived longer under communism or, in China’s case, are more 
likely to be old enough to remember the redistributive rhetoric of the Maoist past. 
 
Several other studies have also found that Marxist beliefs or socialist heritage are 
important in influencing people’s belief formation.  Alesina et al., (2001) emphasise 
the influence of Marxist ideology in explaining differences in preferences for 
redistribution between Europe and the United States. In a comparison of six Eastern 
European countries and six Western countries, Corneo and Gruner (2002) find that the 
Eastern Europeans have stronger preferences for redistribution than the Western 
Europeans. Corneo (2001) and Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007) find that 
following reunification, people living in the former East Germany have stronger 
preferences for redistribution than people living in the former West Germany. 
 
The results for variables representing beliefs that outcomes are outside one’s control 
are consistent with what, in Section two, we described as the ‘altruism’ and 
‘entitlement’ effects. Rich people who believe that outcomes are outside the control of 
the individual are more likely to feel altruistic. Poor people who believe outcomes are 
outside their control are more likely to feel a sense of entitlement to redistribution. To 
examine whether feelings of altruism among the rich or feelings of entitlement among 
the poor are more important in driving the results for ladder position determinants we 
created a dummy variable set qual to one if respondents considered either social 
connections, knowing powerful people or coming from a powerful and wealthy family 
(all factors outside one’s control) to be the main determinant of one’s position in life. 
We interacted this dummy variable with a dummy variable for the top quintile of 
income earners and called this interaction term ‘Altruism’ and with a dummy variable 
for the bottom quintile of income earners and called this interaction term  
‘Entitlement’. We regressed each of the proxies for Belief-L on Altruism, Entitlement 
and controls for personal characteristics (including ideology) and location. If Altruism 
is positive and significant this would be consistent with the existence of high income 
left-wing liberals with a sense of altruism driving the findings, while if Entitlement is 
positive and significant, this would be consistent with low income individuals who 
have a strong sense of entitlement to redistribution driving the results. 
 
--------------------- 
Insert Table 2 
-------------------- 
The results are presented in Panel A of Table 2. The Altruism variable is statistically 
significant with the expected positive sign in each case. The marginal effects are 
largest in the Income Inequality-L and Unemployment-L regressions. The Entitlement 
variable is statistically significant with the expected positive sign in the Education-L 
and Unemployment-L regressions. Overall, Panel A of Table 2 is consistent with a 
strong sense of altruism and mixed sense of entitlement, although there is evidence of 
a sense of entitlement among the poor when it comes to access to education and 
addressing unemployment. An objection to the results in Panel A of Table 2 is that we 
do not control for expectations about the future. It might be that the results for 
Altruism in Panel A of Table 2 reflect a preference for redistribution among high 
income earners who expect their social status to decline in the future in which case 
they may benefit from redistribution. To address this point, in Panel B of Table 2, in 
addition to the controls employed in Panel A, we also control for expectations about 
the future. The Ladder Future variable is statistically significant with the expected 
negative sign in three of the four specifications. The results for Entitlement in Panel B 
are the same as the results in Panel A of Table 2. However, interestingly, Altruism 
ceases to be statistically significant in three of the four specifications, suggesting that  
the results for Altruism in the Education-L, Income Inequality-L and Unemployment-L 
specifications in Panel A of Table 2 may in fact be driven by expectations among high 
income individuals that their fortunes will decline in the future.  
 
As discussed earlier, redistributive preferences among the rich need not be motivated 
purely by altruism, but may reflect a desire to reduce the unpleasantness of seeing 
poverty on the streets. To examine whether this is a factor we re-estimated the same 
specification as reported in Table 1 Panel B, but instead of using a coastal dummy we 
used an interaction term, interacting the top quintile of income earners with a dummy 
variable for cities in the three north-east provinces (Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning). 
The north-east is regarded as the iron rustbelt of China with the highest proportion of 
laid-off workers (see eg Smyth & Zhai, 2003). Our objective was to examine whether 
high income individuals in the north-east, confronted with the sight of large numbers 
of unemployed, would have stronger preferences for redistribution. The results were 
interesting. The high-income north-east interaction term was statistically insignificant 
in the Education-L, Social Protection-L and  Income Inequality-L regressions, but 
statistically significant with a positive sign in the Unemployment-L  regression. In 
other words, confronted with large numbers of laid-off workers, high income people 
in the north-east, were statistically more likely to regard the unemployment problem 
as ‘very serious’ compared with high income individuals in other parts of the country.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
We find evidence that individuals who have better self-assessed prospects of upward 
mobility are statistically less likely to hold left-wing beliefs on social protection and 
unemployment. By extension we can conclude that those who rate their prospects of 
climbing the social ladder in urban China favourably, are less likely to prefer 
redistributive policies designed to provide social welfare or support for the  
unemployed and laid-off. However, self-assessed ability to climb the social ladder had 
no effect on the formation of left-wing views on education or income inequality. We 
also find that the formation of left-wing views and, by extension, support for 
redistributive policies are influenced by individual beliefs on what determines one’s 
status on the social ladder. People who believe one’s position is due to diligence and 
effort are less likely to hold left-wing beliefs on access to education and income 
inequality. Meanwhile, people who believe that success in life is largely due to factors 
outside their control; namely, having the right connections, knowing the right people 
or being born into the right family, were pretty much more likely to hold left-wing 
views and, by extension, favour redistribution across the board. These results were 
robust to controlling for personal characteristics of the respondent including ideology 
and income as well as the location of the city in which he or she lived. 
 
In terms of the relative importance of perceived ability to move up the ladder versus 
what determines one’s status on the ladder, the latter appears to be more important in 
explaining the formation of views about redistribution in China. Those variables 
attributing one’s position in life to factors outside one’s control have a stronger 
positive effect on the formation of left-wing views in urban China than the negative 
effect exerted by either the perception one’s lot is due to factors inside one’s control 
(diligence and effort) or prospects for climbing the social ladder. Specifically, 
variables attributing one’s position in life to factors outside one’s control are 
statistically significant across more models and have larger marginal effects on left-
wing belief formation. As far as the implications for redistributive policy in China, 
reflected in the notion of constructing a harmonious society, there is mixed signals. 
  
On the one hand there is some support for a Hirschman effect suggesting tolerance of 
some inequalities among those who rate their chances to move up the ladder and, at 
the same time, support for redistribution for those who see one’s position in life as 
determined by power and privilege outside their control. That the latter seems to have 
stronger effects on support for redistributive policies lends credence to the objectives 
of what constructing a harmonious society seeks to achieve; lest those who hold 
preferences for redistribution vent their frustrated preferences in the form of political 
or social upheaval which is precisely what the Chinese government is seeking to 
avoid. However, the fact that there is evidence of a tunnelling effect in urban China, 
means the Chinese government has to be careful not to quash the ambitions of those 
who seek to move up the social ladder and who in all likelihood will be the wealth 
creators as China’s market reforms move forward, through heavy-handed 
redistribution. Encouraging those seeking to move up the social ladder, while at the 
same time ensuring adequate social support for those who do not feel able to, will 
entail a delicate balancing act for China’s redistributive policies in coming decades.  
Table 1 Effect of individual beliefs as to what determines one’s position on the social 
ladder and prospects of moving up the social ladder on left-wing views in urban China 
 
  Education-L Social  Protection-L Income Inequality L  Unemployment L 
       
PANEL A 
 








Ladder Position       












































YES  YES YES YES 
Coastal  Dummy  YES  YES YES YES 
Psuedo R
2  0.0331  0.0254 0.0173 0.0257 
Number  of  Observations  7770  7320 7701 7744 
       
PANEL B 








Ladder Position       












































YES  YES YES YES 
Coastal  Dummy  YES  YES YES YES 
Psuedo R
2  0.0499  0.0259 0.0227 0.0260 
Number  of  Observations  7762  7312 7693 7736 
Notes: [1] All variable definitions are in the appendix. [2] All specifications are estimated with logistic 
regressions. [3] Marginal effects are reported. Values of z-statistics are in parenthesis. [4] *, p<0.1; **, 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Source of the data is China Mainland Marketing Research Company, 2002 survey.    
Table 2. The relative importance of altruism and entitlement effects in explaining 
preferences for redistribution in urban China 
 



















Ladder  Future  NO  NO NO NO 
Personal Controls 
(Including Ideology) 
YES  YES YES YES 
Coastal  Dummy  YES  YES YES YES 
Psuedo R
2  0.036  0.016 0.017 0.026 





























YES  YES YES YES 
Coastal  Dummy  YES  YES YES YES 
Psuedo R
2  0.0383  0.0200 0.0162 0.0244 
Number  of  Observations  7762  7312 7693 7736 
Notes: [1] All specifications are estimated with logistic regressions. [3] Marginal effects are reported. 
Values of z-statistics are in parenthesis. [3] *, p<0.1; **, p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Source of the data is 
China Mainland Marketing Research Company, 2002 survey.   
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Appendix – Description of Variables 
 
Education-L: A dummy variable equal to 0 if the answer to the question: “Please 
evaluate the degree of fairness in receipt of educational opportunities” was “very 
fair”, “fair”, “neither fair nor unfair” or “unfair” and 1 if the answer was “very 
unfair”.  
 
Social Protection-L: A dummy variable equal to 0 if the answer to the question: “Do 
you consider the problem of providing  social protection and bad management of 
social welfare to be serious”? was “not serious”, “serious” or “quite serious” and 1 
if the answer was “very serious”. 
 
Income Inequality-L: A dummy variable equal to 0 if the answer to the question: 
“Please evaluate the degree of fairness in the distribution of income” was “very 
fair”, “fair”, “neither fair nor unfair” or “unfair” and 1 if the answer was “very 
unfair”. 
 
Unemployment-L: A dummy variable equal to 0 if the answer to the question: “Do 
you consider the problem of unemployment and being laid-off to be serious”? was 
“not serious”, “serious” or “quite serious” and 1 if the answer was “very serious”. 
 
Ladder Future: An ordered variable capturing responses to the question: “How do you 
expect your social status to change in the future”? Possible responses were 1= 
“substantial decline”, 2= “large decline”, 3= “some decline”, 4= “no change”, 5= 
“some improvement”, 6= “large improvement” and 7= “substantial improvement”. 
 
Ladder Position: A series of dummy variables capturing responses to the question: 
“What do you consider to be the most important factor in determining one’s position 
in life”? Possible answers were “diligence and effort”, good luck and opportunities”, 
“having good social connections”, “knowing powerful people” or “being born into a 
powerful and wealthy family”. 
 
Control Variables: 
Age: Respondent’s age in years. 
 
Gender:  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is male and 0 if the 
respondent is female. 
 
Marital Status: A set of dummy variables corresponding to whether the respondent 
was single, married, divorced and not remarried, divorced and remarried, widowed 
and not remarried or widowed and remarried. 
 
Education:  A set of dummy variables corresponding to the respondent’s highest 
education level: Junior secondary school or below, senior secondary school, 
polytechnic school, three year higher degree or above. 
 
Income: Respondent’s monthly household income (in RMB). 
 
Occupation: A set of dummy variables for the respondent’s occupation.  
  
Coastal: A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent lives in a coastal province; 
zero otherwise. 
 
Ideology: Mean value of responses to the question “Do you perceive there to be a 
conflict of interest between the following”? The five categories are (a) ‘between the 
poor and the wealthy’, (b) ‘between white collar and blue collar workers’, (c) 
‘between labour and capital in private enterprises’, (d) ‘between labour and capital 
in foreign funded enterprises’, (e) ‘between labour and capital in joint ventures’.   
Possible answers are 1= “no conflict”, 2= “very little conflict”, 3= “little conflict”, 
4= “considerable conflict” and 5= “serious conflict”. We interpret people who report 
higher levels of conflict to be to the left of the ideological spectrum. 
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